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The American Mortgage in Historical and International Context
Abstract
Home mortgages have loomed continually larger in the financial situation of American households. In 1949,
mortgage debt was equal to 20 percent of total household income; by 1979, it had risen to 46 percent of
income; by 2001, 73 percent of income (Bernstein, Boushey and Mishel, 2003). Similarly, mortgage debt was
15 percent of household assets in 1949, but rose to 28 percent of household assets by 1979 and 41 percent of
household assets by 2001. This enormous growth of American home mortgages, as shown in Figure 1 (as a
percentage of GDP), has been accompanied by a transformation in their form such that American mortgages
are now distinctively different from mortgages in the rest of the world. In addition, the growth in mortgage
debt outstanding in the United States has closely tracked the mortgage market’s increased reliance on
securitization (Cho, 2004).
The structure of the modern American mortgage has evolved over time. We begin by describing this historical
evolution. The U.S. mortgage before the 1930s would be nearly unrecognizable today: it featured variable
interest rates, high down payments and short maturities. Before the Great Depression, homeowners typically
renegotiated their loans every year.
We next compare the form of U.S. home mortgages today with those in other countries. The U.S. mortgage
provides many more options to borrowers than are commonly provided elsewhere: American homebuyers
can choose whether to pay a fixed or floating rate of interest; they can lock in their interest rate in between the
time they apply for the mortgage and the time they purchase their house; they can choose the time at which
the mortgage rate resets; they can choose the term and the amortization period; they can prepay freely; and
they can generally borrow against home equity freely. They can also obtain home mortgages at attractive terms
with very low down payments. We discuss the nature of the U.S. government intervention in home mortgage
markets that has led to the specific choices available to American homebuyers. We believe that the unique
characteristics of the U.S. mortgage provide substantial benefits for American homeowners and the overall
stability of the economy.
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H ome mortgages have loomed continually larger in the financial situationof American households. In 1949, mortgage debt was equal to 20 per-cent of total household income; by 1979, it had risen to 46 percent of
income; by 2001, 73 percent of income (Bernstein, Boushey and Mishel, 2003).
Similarly, mortgage debt was 15 percent of household assets in 1949, but rose to
28 percent of household assets by 1979 and 41 percent of household assets by 2001.
This enormous growth of American home mortgages, as shown in Figure 1 (as a
percentage of GDP), has been accompanied by a transformation in their form such
that American mortgages are now distinctively different from mortgages in the rest
of the world. In addition, the growth in mortgage debt outstanding in the United
States has closely tracked the mortgage market’s increased reliance on securitiza-
tion (Cho, 2004).
The structure of the modern American mortgage has evolved over time. We
begin by describing this historical evolution. The U.S. mortgage before the 1930s
would be nearly unrecognizable today: it featured variable interest rates, high down
payments and short maturities. Before the Great Depression, homeowners typically
renegotiated their loans every year.
We next compare the form of U.S. home mortgages today with those in other
countries. The U.S. mortgage provides many more options to borrowers than are
commonly provided elsewhere: American homebuyers can choose whether to pay
a fixed or floating rate of interest; they can lock in their interest rate in between the
time they apply for the mortgage and the time they purchase their house; they can
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choose the time at which the mortgage rate resets; they can choose the term and
the amortization period; they can prepay freely; and they can generally borrow
against home equity freely. They can also obtain home mortgages at attractive terms
with very low down payments. We discuss the nature of the U.S. government
intervention in home mortgage markets that has led to the specific choices avail-
able to American homebuyers. We believe that the unique characteristics of the
U.S. mortgage provide substantial benefits for American homeowners and the
overall stability of the economy.
Historical Context
Before the Great Depression, the single-family home mortgage was a very
different instrument. Until the 1930s, residential mortgages in the United States
were available only for a short term (typically 5–10 years) and featured “bullet”
payments of principal at term. Unless borrowers could find means to refinance
these loans when they came due, they would have to pay off the outstanding loan
balance. In addition, most loans carried a variable rate of interest. Bartlett (1989)
presents a fine historical overview of the origins of the modern U.S. mortgage.
Home mortgages typically had very low loan-to-value ratios of 50 percent or less
and thus did not, by themselves, place substantial stress on lenders, because when
borrowers were short of cash, their property could be sold if necessary to redeem
their loan. But during the Great Depression in the early 1930s, property values in
the United States declined by 50 percent relative to peak values. Holders of these
mortgages, knowing their positions were insecure, refused to refinance loans that
came due; as a result, borrowers defaulted, having neither the cash nor the home
equity necessary to pay the loans back. A wave of foreclosures resulted—typically
250,000 per year between 1931 and 1935. At the worst of the Depression, nearly
Figure 1
Mortgage Debt as Percentage of GDP
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10 percent of homes were in foreclosure. Financial institutions would in turn
attempt to resell the properties that they repossessed, which placed even further
downward pressure on the housing market.
In response to these calamities, the federal government began intervening in
the housing finance market. It created three particularly important institutions: the
Home Owner’s Loan Corporation (HOLC), the Federal Housing Administration
(FHA) and the Federal National Mortgage Association (FNMA). Table 1 provides
a timeline of major government housing finance legislation.
The Home Owner’s Loan Corporation (HOLC) raised funds using
government-backed bonds, used the funds to purchase defaulted mortgages from
financial institutions and then reinstated the mortgages. The HOLC changed the
terms of the mortgages drastically, converting variable-rate, short-term, nonamor-
tizing mortgages into fixed-rate, long-term (20-year) fully amortizing mortgages.
(An “amortizing” mortgage is one where the principal is repaid over the life of the
loan, so that the borrower does not face a large lump-sum payment at the end of
the loan.) The HOLC ultimately purchased, reinstated and converted one million
mortgages.
Because the federal government did not see itself as being in the business of
holding mortgages in the long term, it needed to find a way to make these
mortgages marketable. In particular, investors in the mortgages wanted assurance
that they would receive the full principal balance and scheduled interest payments.
While some private mortgage insurance companies were in business for this pur-
pose before the 1930s, they were insufficiently capitalized and failed in the early
1930s. Consequently, the government established the Federal Housing Administra-
tion (FHA) to provide the mortgage insurance necessary for investors to purchase
mortgages with confidence.1
Thus, the invention of the fixed-rate, self-amortizing, long-term mortgage was,
above all else, a response to a general financial crisis, as opposed to a design for the
promotion of homeownership per se. FHA adopted this form of mortgage to avoid
the problem of people needing to refinance, which had clearly led to disaster. The
combination of HOLC and the FHA represented a piece of early “financial engi-
neering” that allowed illiquid financial institutions to become liquid again. The
new long-term mortgage was of course no panacea for U.S. banking problems—
one-third of U.S. banks failed during the Great Depression (Friedman and
Schwartz, 1963)—but it helped.
The Home Owner’s Loan Corporation, having performed its task, was dis-
banded in 1936. In its place, the Federal National Mortgage Association (FNMA,
1 For FHA insurance, the borrower pays an upfront mortgage insurance premium (today 1.5 percent)
and in addition, pays an annual insurance premium that declines over the life of the loan (today, this
starts at around 0.5 percent of the loan balance) until the loan-to-value ratio falls below 75 percent. FHA
has been consistently profitable, excluding the late 1980s. In a typical year, like 1992, it contributed
$1.4 billion to the U.S. Treasury, as shown at p. 50 of http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/budget/
fy2006/pdf/cr_supp.pdf. There has never been a taxpayer payout for FHA. Reserves were used for the
high default period of the late 1980s, which was associated with the savings and loan crisis and
overlending in certain states like Texas.
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which would later be Fannie Mae) was invented as a government agency in 1938 for
the purpose of abetting a secondary market in FHAmortgages. In particular, FNMA
issued bonds for purchasing mortgages at par, so that investors in affluent com-
munities could invest with confidence in mortgages in communities with little local
capital. (Buying at par meant banks had no exposure to interest rate risk when
lending long term and funding these loans by FNMA-issued bonds.)
The mortgage market changed little in the six years following the invention of
FNMA. The Depression, the late 1930s and World War II were all times when the
housing market had relatively little construction and few transactions. In 1925, new
home construction in the United States peaked at 937,000 new units. This total fell
to 93,000 units in 1933, and the 1925 peak was not surpassed (in fact was not even
approached) until after World War II (U.S. Bureau of the Census, 1975).
With the anticipation of the end of World War II came the G.I. Bill of Rights,
officially known as the Servicemen’s Readjustment Act of 1944.2 Included within
the G.I. bill was the invention of the Veterans Administration mortgage insurance
program—a program that allowed veterans returning home to obtain mortgages
with very low down payments. The program was intended both to reward veterans
and to stimulate housing market construction. At about this time, the Federal
Housing Administration (FHA) also sought to stimulate housing construction by
substantially liberalizing its terms. In 1948, the maximum term of a mortgage rose
to 30 years (from an initial maximum of 20 years). In 1956, the FHA raised the
maximum loan-to-value ratio to 95 percent (from an initial maximum of
80 percent) for new construction and to 90 percent for existing homes. However,
the FHA did retain a cap on the size of the loan it would insure, and in doing so,
2 G.I. stands for “government issue.” The term originally applied to articles that were issued in
accordance with military procedures or regulations. By the end of World War II, G.I. or G.I. Joe had
become a nickname for American soldiers, too.
Table 1
Federal Legislation Timeline
1933 The Federal Deposit Insurance System and Home Owners Loan Corporation were
established.
1936 The Federal Housing Administration was created.
1938 Fannie Mae was created to provide a secondary market by for FHA-insured loans.
1944 VA loan program was created as part of the Veterans Bill of Rights.
1948 Fannie Mae begins to purchase VA loans.
1968 HUD and Ginnie Mae were created, and Fannie Mae became a shareholder-owned
government-sponsored enterprise.
1970 Freddie Mac was created (the Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corporation Act).
1981 Savings & loans were allowed to invest in ARMs, and deposit ceilings were removed.
1982 Savings & loans securitize and sell off below-market-rate mortgages.
1986 The Tax Reform Act of 1986 eliminated all interest-related personal deductions except for
mortgages and home equity loans.
1989 Freddie Mac was restructured as a publicly traded corporation, and the Federal Institution
Reform Recovery and Enforcement Act passed.
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it allowed for a private sector market in mortgage insurance to develop for high-
balance loans.3
With the strong expansion of the U.S. economy in the post–World War II
period driving up incomes, together with the new institution of the long-term (and
therefore affordable), fixed-rate, self-amortizing mortgage, homeownership ex-
panded rapidly. America was transformed from a nation of urban renters to
suburban homeowners: the ownership rate among U.S. households rose from
43.6 percent in 1940, the last census year before World War II, to 64 percent by
1980 (Census of Population and Housing, 1940 and 1980). The FHA mortgage was
a key to this transformation. Its profitability to the U.S. Treasury (discussed in
footnote 1) induced large-scale entry of the private sector, which developed the
self-amortizing, privately insured mortgage. The “modern” private mortgage insur-
ance business started with the Mortgage Guarantee Insurance Corporation in 1957
and allowed for lenders to make low down payment loans beyond FHA limits. Over
time, the private sector market share for mortgage insurance grew as it out-
competed the publicly insured provision of mortgage finance: FHA mortgage
insurance fell from 29.4 percent of the mortgage market in 1970 to less than
10 percent in the mid-1990s (Vandell, 1995). Together, the FHA- and the private
sector–provided mortgage, which came to be called the “conventional mortgage,”
dominated the market.
This mortgage market settled into a pattern over the two decades following
World War II. The major funders of mortgages during this period were commercial
banks and savings and loans. These institutions had an inexpensive source of funds
for mortgages: deposits backed by the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (in
the case of banks) or the Federal Savings and Loan Insurance Corporation (in the
case of savings and loans). Because typical relatively small depositories had the full
faith and credit of the U.S. government guaranteeing their deposits, these financial
institutions could offer low interest rates.4 Fixed-rate mortgages typically paid
between 5 and 6 percent in the market. Between 1945 and 1966, yields on
three-month Treasury bills never rose above 4 percent. Depository institutions
could thus raise capital from depositors, who could get a safe government-
protected yield and a higher return than Treasury bills by putting their funds in a
depository institution.
This arrangement began to show some cracks in 1966, when the three-month
Treasury yield rose above 4 percent, and deposits flowed out of savings and loans
and into Treasury bonds, resulting in a shortage of funds for mortgage borrowers.
One of the responses to this event was the 1968 splitting of Fannie Mae into two
pieces: the Government National Mortgage Association, known as Ginnie Mae, and
3 FHA mortgages also did not have prepayment penalties, meaning that households were insulated from
interest rate risk relative to adjustable-rate mortgages. Both adjustable-rate mortgages and fixed-rate
mortgages without prepayment penalty allow borrowers to take advantage of declining interest rates,
however, adjustable-rate mortgages expose the borrower to the risk of interest rate increases. For a
history of the terms of the FHA program, see Cutts and Nothaft (2005).
4 Deposits were insured up to $5,000 until 1950, $10,000 until 1966, $15,000 until 1969, $20,000 until
1974, $40,000 until 1980 and $100,000 thereafter.
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the “new” Fannie Mae, which would now be privately held and would be able to buy
and sell non–government-backed mortgages to raise additional funds for mort-
gages. In addition, by taking Fannie Mae private, the government was able to
remove Fannie Mae’s debt from its balance sheet. Congress created Freddie Mac in
1970 to securitize mortgages issued by savings and loans. A mortgage insurance
function was kept inside the government through Ginnie Mae for two reasons: first,
to continue to provide a full government-backed guarantee of timely payments of
FHA-foreclosed mortgages to the lender; and second, to be able to package and
securitize FHA loans.
Congress’s intent with the creation of Ginnie, the new Fannie and Freddie was
at least in part to assure that the mortgage liquidity problems of 1966 would not
recur. The federal charters that were granted to Fannie and Freddie require them
to promote liquidity and stability in the secondary market for mortgages as well as
to provide mortgage credit throughout the nation. These institutions would in turn
bring uniformity to the mortgage market and invent financial instruments—
derivatives of mortgage-backed securities—that would help keep the mortgage
market liquid from the mid-1980s until today.
The ignition of inflation in the later 1960s and 1970s altered the ability of
depositories to fund long-term, fixed-rate mortgages: inflation pushed up nominal
interest rates and eroded the balance sheets of depositories that funded fixed-rate
mortgages. Depositories found themselves in a straitjacket due to Regulation Q, a
federal rule that placed a ceiling on the rate that depositories could pay depositors.
As nominal interest rates rose, depositories could not match what the market was
paying, and they saw deposits flow out their doors to U.S. Treasury securities—
assets back by the full faith and credit of the United States that paid a market rate
of interest. A second factor in limiting the ability of depositories to fund fixed-rate
mortgages was the rise of new competing savings vehicles, such as money market
funds, mutual funds and pension funds, which paid higher rates than depositories
and which had become accessible to small savers. Also, long-term savings vehicles,
such as pension funds, were better suited to hold investments in long-term assets,
such as securitized long-term mortgages.
The result of the ignition of inflation and the new savings vehicles was an
outflow of funds from the banking sector. This outflow led to a crisis in the savings
and loan industry, a major structural change in U.S. mortgage markets and,
ultimately, a transformation of the housing finance system.5 The commercial
banking industry was not nearly as affected since, unlike savings and loans, which
by statute invested in mortgages, banks were able to invest in a variety of assets.
Legislation responded to the new environment and removed deposit ceilings and
allowed savings and loans to invest in adjustable-rate mortgages.6 But having been
5 For a discussion of the savings and loan crisis and its aftermath, see Benston and Kaufman (1997).
6 The legislation that allowed adjustable-rate mortgages and eliminated interest rate ceilings for savings
and loans was the St. Germain Depository Institutions Act of 1982. Specifically, Title VIII—the “Alter-
native Mortgage Transaction Parity Act of 1982” Sec.803 (A)—“in which the interest rate or finance
charge may be adjusted or renegotiated.”
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burned once, depository institutions were worried about lending at a fixed rate
when there was a risk that nominal interest rates would rise. If a homebuyer chose
an adjustable-rate mortgage, the depositor typically held on to it—since the bor-
rower was absorbing the interest rate risk. If the homebuyer chose a fixed-rate
mortgage, then the lender typically sold it to Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac or Ginnie
Mae, which then packaged the loans into mortgage-backed securities and resold
them to individual investors and institutions whose balance sheets were more
compatible with holding a long-term asset with a fixed nominal rate. Instead of the
traditional reliance on savings and loans and commercial banks as sources of funds
for mortgage loans, funds began to come from securities backed by mortgages and
then traded in a secondary mortgage market. Thus, securitization became a dom-
inant source of funds for long-term residential mortgages.
For a time in the early 1980s, when adjustable-rate mortgages became available
and when many pundits were projecting massive and variable inflation for years to
come, it even appeared that the fixed-rate mortgage might become an historical
anomaly, and that the U.S. mortgage market would return to the adjustable-rate
mortgages that had been common before the 1930s. In a highly volatile inflationary
context, fixed-rate mortgages become exorbitantly costly, largely eliminating their
market, as shown in Figure 2. However, the Federal Reserve brought inflation
under control, and the fixed-rate mortgage regained its vitality, so that it remains
the most common form of residential mortgage financing in the country. In no year
since 1995 has the share of fixed-rate mortgages fallen below 70 percent of the total
market, and in some years, the fixed-rate share has been nearly 90 percent (Freddie
Mac, 2005).7
The shift to mortgages being funded by capital markets rather than by depos-
itories has continued. By the end of 2003, Fannie and Freddie either guaranteed or
held more than $3.6 trillion of mortgages, or about 60 percent of the market in
which they are allowed to participate and 43 percent of the overall market.8 Firms
that purchase U.S. mortgages in the secondary market are managed by profession-
als who are certainly more capable of bearing, matching and managing these risks
than are individual homeowners, thereby reducing the risk that U.S.-style mortgage
lending imposes on homeowners and the overall economy.
In retrospect, the 1950s arrangement of deposit mortgage funding in the
United States came apart on two dimensions. First, people stopped saving solely in
bank accounts and instead, with the liberalization of capital markets, increasingly
used mutual funds, pension funds and the like as savings vehicles. In fact, given the
7 The adjustable-rate mortgage (ARM) share of applications generally fluctuates with the yield curve: as
the yield curve steepens, the ARM share increases, as the cost of ARMs drops relative to fixed-rate
mortgates. The recent increase in the share of ARMs to a 10-year high of 36 percent, coupled with a flat
yield curve, is anomalous, which raises questions as to its origin. Many variants of traditional ARMs have
also been recently developed such as hybrid instruments, interest only loans and option ARMs, which
allow negative amortization. Affordability pressures in some markets may be at work.
8 Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac are permitted to purchase only conforming mortgages—those mortgages
whose balance falls below a regulatory maximum that changes each year with house prices. In 2005, the
conforming loan limit is $359,650.
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growth in the mortgage market, depositories today have insufficient funds to back
the entire demand for mortgages. Second, borrowers want long-term fixed-rate
mortgages. The fixed rates protect them against rising interest rates, and the ability
to refinance protects them against falling interest rates. The savings and loan crisis
made clear the dangers of funding short-term liabilities with long-term assets in
markets with volatile interest rates. Depositories can only hold long-term fixed-rate
mortgages when nominal interest rates are low and stable, as they were in the 1950s
and 1960s. With securitization, long-term assets can be funded through accessing
capital markets, which are increasingly global in scale.
International Context
The U.S. home mortgage is unique in comparison to its international coun-
terparts in developed countries around the world.9 We compare the U.S. mortgage
market with those in the United Kingdom, France, Germany, Italy, Canada and
Japan. We also add Denmark to this mix, as it has the mortgage market that is
arguably most similar to the United States, as well as South Korea, because it is a
puzzling example of a country with a sophisticated (although still developing)
economy and an unsophisticated mortgage market.
Table 2 summarizes key mortgage terms in these countries and is based on the
work of Lea (2003), Diamond (2004), Du¨bel (2004), Wyman (2003) and Renaud
9 Any discussion of how mortgages in the United States compare with their international counterparts
becomes quickly limited to a comparison with mortgages in developed countries. Countries that are not
high-income countries have little in the way of liquid assets relative to GDP and as a result are unable
to fund mortgages easily (Renaud, 2004a). While the ratio of mortgage debt outstanding to GDP was
58 percent in the United States in 2002, it was no more than 14 percent in any Latin American country,
was no more than 11 percent in any Middle Eastern country (other than Israel) and was no more than
22 percent in any South or East Asian country (other than Japan, Hong Kong, Singapore and Taiwan).
Figure 2
Adjustable Rate Mortgages as a Percentage of all Loans
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(2004a). The first column shows the average ratio of the home loan to the value of
the home at the time of purchase; the second column shows the highest loan-to-
value ratio commonly available. The loan-to-value of the U.S. mortgage is actually
higher than in many countries, and the maximum value is high, but by no means
the highest. A number of countries allow borrowing the full value of the home, and
in the United Kingdom and the Netherlands, a homebuyer can borrow more than
the value of the home. (Mortgages with a 110 percent loan-to-value ratio are
possible, although risky, if they are underwritten as though they are consumer loans
with the home as additional collateral.) The third column states whether or not
citizens may take out a second mortgage. The fourth column reports information
about the total level of these countries’ ratio of mortgage debt outstanding to GDP.
The fifth and sixth columns show that the United States, Denmark and Japan are
the only countries in which fixed-rate mortgages are available at all maturities.
In a few other countries, fixed-rate mortgages are available at shorter terms of
10–20 years only. With the exception of Turkey, consumer price index growth was
less than 5 percent in all OECD countries in 2004, yet fixed-rate mortgages are still
rare in most countries, and around the world adjustable-rate mortgages prevail.
The final column shows how easy it is to pay off the mortgage in advance. The U.S.
mortgage market is one of only three in which fee-free prepayment is widely
available, and in only a few other countries, prepayment is of limited availability.
Refinancing a mortgage is clearly much easier in the United States.
To clarify patterns of mortgage markets, we group countries into three cate-
gories: 1) economies with low levels of securitization, which are the United
Table 2
Mortgages Terms across Different Countries
Typical
LTV
Maximum
LTV
For 2nd
mortgage
Mortgage
debt to
GDP
Fixed-term
range
10–20
years
Fixed-term
range 20
years
Repayment
by fee-free
redemption
U.S. 75% 97% A 69% A A A
Denmark 80% 80% A 70% A A A
France 67% 100% L 25% A L N
Germany 67% 80% A 53% A L N
Italy 55% 80% A 13% L L N
Netherlands 90% 115% A 100% A L N
Portugal 83% 90% A 51% N N N
Spain 70% 100% A 42% L L N
UK 69% 110% A 69% L N L
Japan 80% 80% 36% A A L
Korea 40% 75% N 14% L N A
Canada 65% 90% A 44% N N N
Australia 63% 80% A 74% N N L
Notes: Key A  available; L  limited availability; N  no availability.
Source: From Mercer Oliver Wyman and European Mortgage Federation (2003), with supplemental data
on the United States, Japan, Korea, Canada and Australia from Cho (2002), the International Union for
Housing finance (www.housingfinance.org, 2005) and authors’ calculations.
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Kingdom, Canada and Japan; 2) economies with substantial levels of securitization,
which include Germany and Denmark; and 3) economies with (relative to the
others) less developed financial markets and low mortgage debt obligations,
including France, Italy and South Korea.
Countries with Low Levels of Securitization: United Kingdom, Canada and Japan
In the United Kingdom, variable-rate mortgages dominate. Thus, British
homeowners bear significant interest rate risk, a risk that they are not particularly
well-suited to bear and cannot easily hedge. One of the reasons for reliance on
variable-rate mortgages is that the United Kingdom relies on depository institu-
tions, rather than capital markets, to fund mortgages—and depositories prefer to
have borrowers absorb the interest rate risk. But Miles (2003) also suggests that
borrowing habits in the UK are path-dependent—that because fixed-rate mortgages
have never been widely used in the UK, borrowers do not understand the benefit of
paying a higher coupon rate in exchange for a reduction in balance sheet risk.
Canadian borrowers also, unlike their U.S. counterparts, lack access to mort-
gages with fixed rates, penalty-free prepayment and high loan-to-value ratios.
Canadian mortgages rarely have rates that are fixed for more than five years—and
seven seems to be the outside limit.10 They almost always have “yield maintenance”
penalties—that is, penalties that guarantee lenders a minimum rate of return over
a minimum period of time—for the period of time at which the interest rate is
fixed. Finally, Canadian mortgages without mortgage insurance can take on a
maximum loan-to-value ratio of 75 percent; where as the U.S. rule is 80 percent.
Canada does have an FHA-like mortgage insurance fund, called the National
Housing Act (NHA) fund. NHA loans have the full faith and credit of the Canadian
government behind them, and the investors in these loans are guaranteed the
timely payment of principal and interest. Loans insured by this fund can generally
have loan-to-value ratios of up to 90 percent and sometimes more. Mortgages
backed through the NHA are also securitized and resold to the capital markets: in
fact, the mortgage-backed securities issues by NHA are therefore quite similar to
those issues by Ginnie Mae in the United States. But beyond those mortgages
explicitly backed by the Canadian government, mortgages in Canada are not
securitized, but are rather largely held by depositories. In 2004, more than
75 percent of mortgage debt outstanding in Canada was held in portfolios of bank
and credit unions (which helps to explain why interest rates are fixed only for short
periods), and mortgage-backed securities represented only 12.7 percent of the total
residential credit outstanding in Canada. Apparently, if the Canadian government
does not back mortgages, Canadian capital markets have little appetite for other
mortgage-backed securities.
The Japanese mortgage market has grown rapidly in the past 30 years; the ratio
of mortgage debt outstanding in that country has risen from 21 percent in 1980 to
36 percent in 2003. In fact, Japan’s mortgage market has evolved in a way that
10 We consulted the websites of the largest Canadian banks to form this conclusion.
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resembles the evolution of the U.S. mortgage market, although with a lag. An
excellent overview of mortgage finance in Japan comes from Credit Suisse First
Boston (2004).
In 1950, Japan set up a government corporation, the Government Housing
Loan Corporation (GHLC), to provide stable housing finance and to stimulate the
construction of housing after World War II. GHLC provided long-term fixed-rate
mortgages with spreads of roughly 100 to 150 basis points over Japanese ten-year
Treasury notes. Currently, GHLC mortgages make up about one-third of the
mortgage market in Japan; the rest comes largely from private sector banks. GHLC
borrowers faced some limits; for instance, they can pay no more than 25 percent of
their income in mortgage payments.
Securitization of residential mortgages has come to Japan relatively recently,
under conditions somewhat reminiscent of the U.S. housing market in the 1930s.
With the collapse of Japanese real estate values in the early 1990s, specialized
housing lending institutions in Japan became insolvent, as mortgage defaults rates
increased. As part of the structural reform of Japanese financial institutions, the
Japanese government enacted a 1998 law that allowed for asset-backed securitiza-
tion; in 2001, the government charged GHLC with the responsibility for developing
residential mortgaged-backed securities. GHLC mortgages by law may not carry a
prepayment penalty, unlike the long-term mortgages offered by banks. However,
banks offer mostly adjustable-rate or short-term (typically three-year) fixed-rate
mortgages.
In 2003, around $8 billion in new Japanese mortgages were securitized
through GHLC. This is a start, but only a small part of the country’s mortgage
market. There are also proposals to replace GHLC with another institution in the
near future to encourage securitization and fixed-rate long-term mortgages, but no
plans for this new institution have yet been set forth.
Countries with Securitization: Germany and Denmark
German mortgages appear to provide only limited options to borrowers. The
loan-to-value ratios on first position mortgages are low (60 percent or less), and
such mortgages generally have “yield maintenance” clauses—requirements that
when borrowers prepay, they pay the lender all the interest they would have paid
had they amortized the mortgage to maturity. If borrowers wish to borrow more
than 60 percent, they may take out second mortgages up to an additional 20
percent of value. The result is that lenders in mortgage bonds in Germany take on
little credit risk, and much more risk is born by borrowers. In addition, German
borrowers may not easily extract equity from their homes through the mortgage
market.
Nonetheless, Germany has a deep mortgage market, with a ratio of mortgage
debt outstanding to GDP ratio of 54 percent. Germany’s mortgage system relies on
capital markets to fund mortgages through bonds called Pfandbriefe and not just
depositories. The interest rates charged on first mortgages are only slightly above
rates on government bonds of similar maturity. Germany also has a government-
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backed institution for funding mortgages aimed at lower-income and first-time
homebuyers.
Denmark is the only country to have a widely available mortgage that contains
most of the key features of the U.S. mortgage. Denmark’s mortgage market also
relies heavily on capital markets for financing its mortgages. Danish mortgages are
freely pre-payable in the U.S. sense without a penalty per se—although Danish
borrowers must redeem the bonds underlying their mortgages at market value,
rather than at par.11 In addition, Danish borrowers have an option not generally
available to U.S. borrowers: when Danes sell their homes, they can essentially pass
on their mortgage to the next homeowner. As such, a mortgage whose coupon rate
is below the market rate at the time of sale need not be paid off.
However, prospective Danish homebuyers face two limitations more severe
than their U.S. counterparts. First, required down payments in Denmark are far
higher than in the United States. In the United States, for example, mortgages with
a loan-to-value ratio of 80 percent get the best terms available in the market, and
mortgages with even higher loan-to-value ratios are readily available if the
borrower purchases mortgage insurance. In Denmark, to get to a mortgage with an
80 percent loan-to-value ratio, borrowers must take out a variable-rate second
mortgage. Second, borrowers in Denmark must fit a strict and uniform set of
underwriting criteria to qualify for a mortgage. This provision makes the Danish
mortgage homogenous with respect to credit risk and therefore easy to securitize.
But it also means that some borrowers who would be able to qualify for a mortgage
in the United States, where standards for qualifying are more flexible, would get
shut out of the Danish market.
Countries with Low Mortgage Debt Outstanding: France, Italy and South Korea
For an economy of its size and sophistication, France has a remarkably small
mortgage market. Its ratio of mortgage debt outstanding to GDP is only 25 percent,
less than half the ratios found in the United States and Germany. Yet by world
standards, French mortgage terms are consumer friendly. Over half the mortgages
in France have fixed rates to term (although this term is generally less than 20
years), and prepayment penalties are limited by statute. But the regulatory envi-
ronment for mortgages in France is complicated, which seems to have led to a
business where risk-adjusted profits are lower than they are in other countries and
the number of suppliers of mortgages in France is limited. In addition, mortgage
interest is not subsidized in France, while the rental market is heavily regulated and
subsidized.
The mortgage market in Italy is very small, with a ratio of mortgage debt
outstanding to GDP ratio of 13 percent. The type of mortgages available helps to
11 For an excellent description of Danish mortgages, see Frankel, Gyntelberg, Kjeldsen and Persson
(2004). One caveat worth noting: Danish mortgages are not prepayable if they were financed with
noncallable bonds—but most mortgages are backed with callable bonds. These transaction costs, as well
as affordability pressures, may explain the development and growth of a new instrument in Denmark;
the Bolix-X. The Bolix-X is an adjustable-rate mortgage with a cap (Jensen, 2005).
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explain why: they carry variable-rates of interest, are short term, have low loan-to-
value ratios and have prepayment penalties. Moreover, the banking and property
registration systems are far less developed in Italy relative to the rest of Europe. Italy
continues to regulate interest rates paid on deposits as well as bank staffing levels
and has among the longest processing times for mortgages in Europe. Moreover,
Italy lacks a central, electronic property registration database, which means that the
process of valuing collateral takes longer than in other countries (European
Mortgage Federation, 2003).
However, Italy’s mortgage market is developing. Italy has begun to turn to
capital markets for funding mortgages. While the volume of Italian mortgage
securities remains small (around $10 billion were issued in 2003), it has been
growing at a double-digit pace (ESF, 2004). Italy’s ratio of mortgage debt to GDP,
while still small, is four times larger than it was only 15 years ago. In addition, Italy’s
unfortunate experiences with high inflation since World War II have made long-
term lending less attractive. But since Italy now uses the euro for its currency, the
legacy of high inflation may no longer cast a shadow of high inflation risks for the
future.
We finish our world tour of mortgage markets with a brief stop in South Korea,
which offers an interesting case of a country whose economy has developed
impressively over the past 50 years, but whose mortgage system has not. This is in
contrast with other affluent Asian countries such as Singapore and Taiwan. For
example, the ratio of mortgage debt outstanding to GDP in Korea is 14 percent—
similar to the level in Italy. The corresponding level in Singapore is 59 percent.
Loan-to-value ratios in Korea, although rising, remain very low at 40 percent or
less (Cho, 2002). In response, the Korean government in 1999 developed a corpo-
ration called KoMoCo, which became Korea Housing Finance Corporation
(KHFC) as of 2004, whose purpose is to securitize mortgages. KHFC acts as a
conduit between mortgages and capital markets, much as Fannie, Freddie and
Ginnie do in the United States, and much as Pfundbriefe do in Germany and
mortgage-backed bonds do in Denmark. However, Korean housing and mortgage
markets face two fundamental issues not found in other countries.
First, the Korean land market was heavily regulated through the period leading
up to the Asian financial crisis in 1997–1998 (Renaud, 2004b). Property values
become artificially high as the demand for land in the rapidly growing country
vastly outstripped the supply made available by the government. As land use
became liberalized and the economy slowed in the late 1990s, property values fell.
This recent volatility in the property market in Korea will make higher loan-to-value
mortgages less attractive to investors.
Second, distribution channels for mortgages in Korea are highly concentrated
and limited. In 1999, a single lender originated 75 percent of mortgages in Korea
(Cho, 2002); this contrasts with a 9 percent market share for the top lender in the
United States. The lack of competition in the origination market offers less incen-
tive to provide Korean borrowers with a variety of mortgage products. Today, the
vast majority of mortgages offered in Korea are short-term (three-year) adjustable-
rate bullet loans, which make households and the economy highly vulnerable to
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mortgage payment shock if interest rates rise and explains the effort on the part of
the government to encourage long-term mortgages.
Our tour of world markets illustrates differing outcomes in mortgage systems
across countries: for those countries where depository institutions prevail, includ-
ing the UK and Canada, mortgages tend to be held in depository portfolios, there
is a lack of securitization, and borrowers tend to be limited to adjustable-rate
mortgages or short-term instruments. For countries with substantial mortgage
securitization, such as Denmark and Germany, concern over bank solvency has led
to regulations that limit borrowers’ option to prepay and to refinance at lower rates
when rates drop (because this would increase financial institutions’ earnings vola-
tility). Countries with low mortgage debt outstanding, such as France, Italy and
South Korea, tend to have less developed financial markets in general and, as a
result, lack securitization and mortgage choice, limiting borrowers’ interest rate
and prepayment options.
The Future of the American Mortgage
The United States seems to have found a formula for offering favorable
conditions and choices to mortgage borrowers, maintaining liquidity in mortgage
markets and managing the risks of lending at fixed interest rates. The Federal
National Mortgage Association and the Federal Home Loan Mortgage
Corporation—that is, Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac—play a central role in the U.S.
mortgage market by raising funds to issue securitized mortgages and by playing an
active role in the secondary market for mortgage-backed securities. This institu-
tional framework for the U.S. mortgage market raises several questions. First, just
how do Fannie and Freddie distribute the risk from mortgages with fixed interest
rates and easy prepayment options across the economy? Second, even if Fannie and
Freddie were useful in developing the U.S. market for securitized mortgages, could
their functions now be replaced by fully private agents? Third, a number of analysts
have pointed out that Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac have an anomalous status of
being nominally private firms that nonetheless are perceived by capital market to
have ties with the federal government that allow them access to funds more cheaply
than any potential competitors (in this journal, for example, Frame and White,
2005). Does the existence of such government-sponsored enterprises, as they are
sometimes called, create potential risks that may offset any benefits they provide?
To understand the future of the American mortgage, we examine these questions
in turn.
How Do American Financial Institutions Distribute the Risk from Fixed-Interest
Rate, Prepayable Mortgages across the Economy?
Both the agency and private label mortgage-backed securities use structured
transactions to manage the risk from fixed-interest rate, prepayable mortgages.
These structured transactions allow for the distribution of this risk through the
economy. Fixed-rate, prepayable mortgages present two major risks: interest rates
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may change; and since borrowers can prepay, the duration of the mortgages is
uncertain.
To understand how these risks can interact, consider a life insurance company
that invests in mortgages and/or mortgage-backed securities. Let us say that the
present value of the cash-flow owed to their policyholders is paid out, on average,
in year ten. The insurance company then buys mortgages or mortgage-backed
securities with an expected duration of ten years. If interest rates rise, then the
insurance company finds that the value of its mortgage securities has declined, and
it may have insufficient reserves to pay off its claims, unless the duration is matched
precisely with the obligation. Now suppose interest rates fall. Borrowers have an
incentive to prepay, and the duration of the insurance company’s assets shortens.
Cash that comes in must be reinvested at a lower rate—meanwhile, the present
value of the company’s liabilities increase with the falling discount rate. The
insurance company is foiled in its attempt to match its long-term obligations with
a long-term asset, as the duration of mortgages decreases in a falling interest rate
environment.
To hedge against interest rate changes and to reduce the volatility of duration,
mortgage-backed securities in the United States are sliced using one of four broad
derivative types: 1) sequential tranches; 2) planned amortization class (PAC) and
companion bonds; 3) interest only (IO) and principal only (PO) strips; and
4) floaters and inverse floaters. Let us briefly describe these derivatives and their
purposes.
In a sequential tranch, the cash flows from the mortgage-backed securities are
divided into rating classes.12 A common pattern is for senior tranches to receive
principal—both scheduled and unscheduled (that is, what occurs from prepay-
ments)—before junior tranches. Until senior tranches get paid off, junior tranches
receive only interest payments. The timing of payment to the more senior tranches
occurs with a great deal of certainty, while the market for junior tranches is then left
to speculators, who expect a higher return in exchange for the risk they assume.
In the planned amortization class (PAC) structure, which can be viewed as a form
of tranch, investors in PACs are guaranteed the timing of their cash flows—so long
as the underlying mortgage prepayments fall within a range of specified prepay-
ment schedules. This security is very popular and accounts for more than
50 percent of residential mortgage-backed security derivatives (Fabozzi, 2001).
However, the “companions” to these PACs that come into play when the underlying
mortgage prepayments fall outside the specified schedules are very risky.
In “stripped” securities, the payments from a security are divided into separate
instruments. Principal-only (PO) strips are securities that pay investors only principal
payments—scheduled and unscheduled—at the time the borrower makes these
payments. As interest rates fall, principal payments arrive faster, and at a lower
discount rate, meaning that the security becomes much more valuable; the con-
verse happens when rates rise. PO strips thus make a good hedge to portfolios that
12 For detailed descriptions of Sequential Tranching and Planned Amortization Class Securities, see
Fabozzi (2001, chapters 9 and 10, respectively).
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would suffer from falling interest rates. Interest only (IO) strips, on the other hand,
can rise in value as interest rates rise. Although the discount rate rises with interest
rates, the sum total of interest payments rises, too, as prepayments slow. IO strips
are thus useful hedges for portfolios that would suffer from rising interest rates.
Finally, floaters have a small duration, while inverse floaters have an extreme
duration. These derivatives break a fixed-rate underlying security into two pieces:
the return of the floater is usually contracted to be some specified spread over the
benchmark London Interbank interest rate (LIBOR). Therefore, the return on the
floater rises or falls with prevailing interest rates, and it tends to keep roughly the
same value regardless of the interest rate environment. The return on the inverse
floater moves inversely with interest rates—that is, it generally falls as the bench-
mark LIBOR interest rate rises—and therefore its value is exceptionally sensitive to
changes in interest rates. The inverse floater is an important hedge instrument for
institutions that would suffer from falling interest rates, but it is a highly speculative
financial instrument. The financial difficulties of Orange County, California, in the
early 1990s were in large part a function of an over-reliance on inverse floaters as
an investment (Erisk, 2001).
These financial instruments are crucial to the ability of the United States to
finance its unusual mortgage structure, because they allow investors to manage the
complicated interest rate risk embedded in the U.S. mortgage. No other country,
so far as we can tell, has anything like the panoply of financial products in the
United States. Japan does have a mortgage derivative structure that resembles the
United States, where the GHLC securitizes and then slices and dices mortgages, but
the Japanese market for mortgage-backed securities is less than 1 percent of the size
of the U.S. market. The derivative markets increase investment demand for
mortgage-backed securities, thus supporting liquidity and delivering low-cost fund-
ing, even in times of financial distress, for the mortgage market.
Could Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac be Replaced by Fully Private Agents?
Some argue that even if Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac have indeed created
substantial benefits to homebuyers and to the U.S. economy through their devel-
opment of the secondary market for mortgage-backed securities, they have outlived
their usefulness. As a parallel example in the housing market, private mortgage
insurance learned from mimicking successful government mortgage insurance
until the government program became redundant (White, 2002; Wallison, Stanton
and Eli, 2004). Now that many agents in the U.S. financial markets have experience
with mortgage-backed securities and derivatives, could Fannie Mae and Freddie
Mac step aside with little loss?
One argument in support of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac is that because they
can borrow at preferential rates, due to their implicit federal government guaran-
tee, they can pass on lower interest rates for home mortgages. But, of course, this
argument cuts in several directions. Funneling lower-than-market rate financial
capital raises the risk that society will invest an inefficiently high amount in housing,
and also that the risks of that investment are being underpriced by the market. No
one wants to find out if the federal government would really pay off tens of billions
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of dollars if Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac became bankrupt. But setting aside the
argument about lower interest rates for a moment, Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac
mortgage-backed securities have three other major differences with the private
label market: 1) the ability to make forward commitments; 2) the structure of the
securities; and 3) interest rate spreads relative to U.S. Treasury bonds at times of
general financial market stress.
A substantial portion of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac securities are sold into
the so-called “To Be Announced,” or TBA, market (Beller, 2004). These transac-
tions involve forward sales of mortgage-backed securities comprised of pools of
mortgages not yet identified and in many cases not yet in existence. Market
participants in the TBA market set the standards that the securities and the
mortgages in the pools must meet based on mortgage pools already available to the
market. This mechanism allows Fannie and Freddie to “lock in” mortgage rates for
borrowers in advance of having actual mortgage available for purchase. This
provision is popular among borrowers, particularly for fixed-rate mortgages, but it
is only possible because Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac do not face the same
disclosure requirements for their debt securities as fully private firms.
The structure of mortgage-backed securities from Fannie Mae and Freddie
Mac are quite different from private-label securities because Fannie and Freddie
put their corporate guarantees behind every dollar of mortgage-backed securities
that they issue. By contrast, in the private label market, the securities are divided
into different credit rating classes, or credit tranches. The implicit government
guarantee that allows Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac to raise funds more cheaply also
gives them the ability to attract the best credit and collateral risk mortgages to their
mortgage pools; they can use these good risks to offset higher credit and collateral
risks from other mortgages. In return for the funding advantage, Fannie Mae and
Freddie Mac must provide funding in all places at all times. For example, Ambrose
and Buttimer (2005) show that rural housing markets, which are less information-
ally rich than more thickly traded urban markets, are tied into capital markets
through Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac. The private label market, on the other
hand, relies on structured transactions that separate risks instead of pooling them,
which induces the private market to give favorable treatment to lower risk places.
The ability of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac to avoid credit tranching avoids the
payment of fees to investment banks and rating agencies (Frame and White, 2005).
It also results in more homogenous and therefore more liquid securities. Indeed,
in our view, one key to the array of choices being offered to mortgage borrowers is
that, because of the funding advantage of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, low-risk
borrowers are offered an appealing contract so they will participate in the same
mortgage pool as higher-risk borrowers.13 Otherwise, higher- and medium-risk
borrowers might face a very different menu of mortgage options than lower-risk
borrowers. The private label market would likely charge more to borrowers of
13 The way in which Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac use their funding advantage to create broader pools
can be viewed as a clever, if accidental, method for solving the Stiglitz and Weiss (1981) pooling problem
in the mortgage context.
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different risk categories. The pooling of risk through Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac
extends the market to marginally credit worthy borrowers and crowds out risk-
based lending to this market segment.
For interest rate risk, both the private label market and the agencies have the
option to tranch, which they sometimes, but not always, exercise. With respect to credit
risk, however, the private label market nearly always tranches, and Fannie and Freddie
nearly always pool. The Fannie and Freddie pools are treated as homogeneous secu-
rities by investors. This pattern leads to deep markets and economies of scale that
reduce costs to all borrowers, including those who are the best credit risks.
While the private label market can offer fixed-rate mortgages in the United
States, they do so both at higher mortgage rates and with higher down payment
requirements (Wachter, 2002).14 Moreover, as mortgage securities become more
heterogeneous, there is a danger that liquidity in the mortgage market would be
reduced, particularly to certain types of borrowers and places.
Finally, during periods of financial duress, the risk-based differentials would
increase in the absence of mortgage-backed securities, which provide a safe haven
for investors. For example, in the immediate aftermath of the 1997–1998 financial
crisis and in the aftermath of 9/11, interest rate spreads related to risk widened for
many corporate bonds, but the risk spreads of Fannie and Freddie securities
changed very little. Similarly, in the wake of the Long-Term Capital Management
financial crisis in of 1998, volumes in many debt markets fell dramatically, while
they did not do so in the residential mortgage market.15 The fact that investors
perceive that Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac have implicit government backing may
well have something to do with the fact that markets for residential U.S. mortgages
remain liquid even in times of financial distress. The differentials in mortgage
options offered to low-risk borrowers relative to high- and medium-risk borrowers
would likely increase significantly in periods of financial crisis.
In short, U.S. mortgage markets would probably look quite different in the
absence of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac. Not only would interest rates probably
rise for borrowers, but locking in a mortgage interest rate in advance would become
harder or impossible, the menu of mortgage options might divide as mortgage
pools broke up into smaller pieces with different risk characteristics, the segmented
pricing of mortgages by borrower credit risk would increase, and financial markets
would have one less safe haven. Perhaps most important, an entirely private market
could well become one that led to an increased reliance on adjustable-rate mort-
gages. Work from the IMF (2004)—along with the fact that household balance
sheets would be mismatched in an adjustable-rate mortgage heavy world—suggests
that such an outcome could lead to macroeconomic instability.
14 Private label mortgage rates, already higher than the rates for Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, might
even be higher in the absence of Fannie and Freddie, which provide a benchmark and hedging
instruments with which the private mortgage-backed securities market trades.
15 Lehnert, Passmore and Sherlund (2005) are skeptical, but they also point out that Fannie and Freddie
bought 75 percent of the mortgages issued in the aftermath of the Russian financial crisis. This is much
higher than the companies’ typical market share.
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Does the Implicit Government Support of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac Create
Potential Risks that May Offset any Benefits They Provide?
The implicit government guarantees for Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac create
moral hazard problems; that is, risky loans may be made in the assurance that the
government will not allow a default to occur. Frame and White (2005) and Jaffe
(2003) both emphasize the risk of allowing Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac to borrow
at a lower-than-market interest rate and suggest either the need to void the implicit
subsidy so that the institutions pay the market rate of interest or to make sure that
they are sufficiently tightly regulated to avoid an interest rate induced financial
crisis. Obviously, an explicit removal of the implicit government guarantee would
also eliminate the funding advantage that allows Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac to
create such broad pools for their mortgage-backed securities and would also
eliminate the market for mortgage-backed securities as a safe haven in times of
financial distress. Jaffe also suggests that interest rate risk can be well-regulated,
although he fears that Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac are still not regulated in a
sufficiently rigorous way.
Indeed, Fannie and Freddie have added to the anxiety over risks they might
pose to the U.S. Treasury by displaying inadequate accounting and financial
controls (Poole, 2003). Baker-Botts (2003) performed an investigation of Freddie
Mac’s accounting practices at the request of that company’s board of directors and
had this to say:
The Company’s disclosure practices, especially as regards sensitive transac-
tions such as Linked Swaps and those designed as a response to FAS 133,
tended to produce generalized disclosures of strategies, rather than transpar-
ent disclosures of transactions. As a result, disclosure processes and practices
fell below the standards required of a registered public company.16
To give a similar flavor for Fannie Mae, a story in the Wall Street Journal on March
9, 2005, reported (Hagerty, 2005):
Fannie Mae’s regulator announced that it has instructed the mortgage com-
pany to correct “deficiencies” in its controls over accounting ledgers and
other corporate records. The new requirements include the adoption of
policies banning falsified signatures on accounting journal entries and limit-
ing employees’ ability to alter database records.
Both companies clearly failed to perform one of the most basic functions of a
publicly traded company: that is, to report earnings correctly and according to
generally accepted accounting practices. At the center of these reporting problems
is accounting for the derivatives that they issue and use to manage their interest rate
16 A “linked swap” is a swap that is linked to some rate of return in the marketplace—for example, a swap
that pays LIBOR plus some margin in exchange for a fixed-rate payment would be a linked swap. FAS
133 is the financial accounting standard for derivatives.
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and duration risks. These particular accounting rules are complicated and contro-
versial. But it is vital for Fannie and Freddie to manage and to report their interest
rate risks well, or they could fail as did savings and loans in the 1980s crisis. The
accounting and disclosure infrastructure for Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac appears
to have been inadequate.
These risks from Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac are real, but there are also ways
in which these institutions reduce systemic risk for the U.S. economy. The continu-
ing liquidity of the mortgage market in recent decades has been consistent with,
and perhaps has contributed to, a long period of relative macroeconomic stability
(Peek and Wilcox, 2003; Wachter and Zandi, 2004). The mortgage market’s ability
to withstand the stress of interest rate spikes and deliver capital has likely contrib-
uted to an attenuation of the business cycle. The ability of mortgage-backed
securities to offer a safe haven in times of financial stress has already been
mentioned. The International Monetary Fund (2004) pointed out that as more
variable-rate mortgages are used to finance housing, the more volatile is the
housing market, which can induce the credit risk that raises the chance of a
systemic failure. Similarly, an illiquid housing market could lead to falling housing
prices, which can increase credit risk, which could induce systemic failure. Any risk
that the implicit government guarantees for Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac might
bring on a systemic crisis must be weighed against their ability in other settings to
advance the stability of the financial system.
Conclusion
The home mortgages available to borrowers in the United States have evolved
over time into a broadly available menu of choices that is not available anywhere
else in the world. We believe that this menu of choices for the overwhelming
majority of borrowers is possible because the U.S. mortgage system—with the
implicit government guarantee for Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac—has solved the
problem of how to persuade low-risk borrowers to join with higher-risk borrowers
in broad mortgage pools, which provide the basis for mortgage-backed securities
which can then be sliced up in financial markets.
But the benefits to mortgage borrowers come with their own set of risks:
namely, the risk that Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac will malfunction in a way that
will either cost the federal government a lot of money, or lead to a systematic crisis
in U.S. financial markets, or both. This risk is real. But the benefits from the current
U.S. system of mortgage finance for borrowers and macroeconomic stability are
also real and should not be lightly discarded.
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